Animals react and adjust to the behavior of their conspecifics. Much less is known about whether animals also react and adjust to the psychological states of others. Recent evidence suggests that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) follow the gaze of others around barriers, past distracters, and check back if they find nothing. Chimpanzees can gauge the motives of a human experimenter and distinguish his intentional from accidental actions. These results suggest that chimpanzees interpret the perceptions and actions of others from a psychological perspective -they seem to know what others can and cannot see and what goals others pursue. It is hypothesized that the co-operation of (1) the ability to operate on psychological states and (2) the motivation to share emotions and experiences with others are key ingredients in the making of human minds.
Recent advances on the study of infant cognition have revealed a number of sophisticated skills in various domains. Young infants reason about various physical properties of objects and events (Baillargeon, 1995) , they have some appreciation of numbers (Wynn, 1998) , and learn language in ways not known before (Tomasello, 2003) . The study of social cognition in infants has also experienced considerable progress. By six months of age infants are sensitive to biological motion (Bertenthal, 1996) , have expectations about human actions (Woodward, 1999) , and follow the gaze of others (D'Entremont, Hains & Muir, 1997) . Between 9 and 12 months of age infants perceive actions as goal directed (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra & Bíró, 1995) , follow gaze around barriers and past distractors (Butterworth & Jarred, 1991; Moll & Tomasello, 2004) , and begin to engage in joint attention with adults (Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998) . By 14 months they distinguish intentional and accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998) , interpret unfulfilled actions appropriately (Meltzoff, 1995) , understand that others are selecting action plans (Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002) , and understand that others may attend selectively to certain aspects of the environment (Caron, Kiel, Dayton & Butler, 2002; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003) . After these initial developments in the areas of intention and attention, children in their second year of life begin to use epistemic states such as pretense, knowledge, and belief that will culminate around fifth birthdays with the ability to pass formal false belief attribution tasks.
Much less is known about the development of nonhuman social minds, including those of our closest relatives. In this paper I will make a case for the existence of social minds in the chimpanzee and other great apes. My goal is not to convince the reader that chimpanzee minds are exactly like human minds, but to show that there are important similarities that extend beyond observable behavior into the psychological realm. Thus, a main thesis of this paper is that at least chimpanzees not only perceive the behavior of others, they also interpret it. This proposal will probably strike a familiar cord with many developmentally-oriented researchers who have thought about similar issues in relation to human development. This is no coincidence. Perhaps more than ever, the areas of developmental and comparative cognition are following paths with multiple points of common interest.
To make the case for social minds in chimpanzees, I will present some recent data on the ability of chimpanzees (and other great apes when it is available) to understand perceptions and actions of others, which correspond to the psychological states of attention and intention, respectively. A series of studies on gaze following will illustrate the area of attention whereas studies on goal detection and distinguishing intentional from accidental actions will illustrate the area of intention. Both data sets share in common that similar studies have been conducted with human infants so that a direct comparison is possible. In the final part of the paper I will discuss the implications of this research for theory of mind, and highlight a possible important difference that may have made human and ape minds so close in so many respects, and so different in others.
The perceptions of others
One of the perhaps most influential developments in social cognition is that of joint attention. Joint attention, which emerges between 9 to 12 months of age in humans , consists of two individuals attending to the same third entity (be it an object or another social entity) and to each other. Thus, joint attention is not simply looking at the same object simultaneously, but alternating gaze between the object of interest and the social partner. According to several theorists, joint attention is important because it allows infants to align their impressions of the external world with those of others by experiencing the same phenomena that others are experiencing. In fact, joint attention is regarded as a key component in the development of both language (Tomasello, 1999) and epistemic mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995) .
A key building block of joint attention is gaze following defined as using the gaze (or head) direction of a social partner toward a third external entity. Gaze following is a skill that develops progressively in human infants. Six month-old infants can follow gaze to targets that are visible within their visual field (D'Entremont et al., 1997) . By 12 months of age infants can also follow gaze behind and around barriers (Moll & Tomasello, 2004) , past distractors (Butterworth & Jarred, 1991) and to entities located behind them (Deák, Flom & Pick, 2000) . At this age infants are also sensitive to the information provided by the eyes, and will follow gaze more often when the eyes are visible than when they are covered (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002) . Moreover, 14 month-old infants are more likely to follow gaze if the head and eyes point in the same direction than if they point in different directions (Caron, Butler & Brooks, 2002) . Taken together these results suggest that infants are not just following cues such as head direction, but they also have an appreciation of what others can see. Given the central importance of gaze following for the development of social cognition in human infants, we could start our quest for other social minds by asking how widespread this ability is in other animals.
Several studies have shown that primates, dolphins, goats, seals, and dogs are capable of gaze following (Itakura, 1996; Tschudin, Call, Dunbar, Harris & van der Elst, 2001; Kaminski, Riedel, Call & Tomasello, 2005; Scheumann & Call, 2004; Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál & Csányi, 1998) . For instance, Tomasello, Call, and Hare (1998) presented five primate species with the following situation. A human experimenter located on an observation tower surveyed the group of individuals until he found two that were sitting facing each other and with one of them (the looker) facing the observation tower. Then, the experimenter showed a piece of food to the looker that induced her to look up at it, and they scored how the subject responded to the looker's orienting response. In the control condition, the experimenter presented the food in an identical manner in the absence of a looker. All five species reliably followed the looker's gaze direction to the food much more often in the experimental than in the control condition. Other studies have extended these findings by showing that primates can respond to the visual gaze direction of humans when the target is above and behind them (e.g., Itakura, 1996) or that chimpanzees also follow the gaze direction of human beings, and they can even do this on the basis of eye direction alone, independent of head direction (e.g., Povinelli & Eddy, 1996) .
There are of course many interpretations of gaze following behavior. One possibility is that it simply reflects an automatic orienting response based on either a hard-wired mechanism or some acquired contingency. For instance, individuals may have learned that if the eyes (or head) of the partner turn to the left -look at the left side whereas if they go to the right -look at the right side (Emery, 2000) . Note that this interpretation is silent regarding the reason for looking behavior, it is just about orientation. Another possibility is that gaze following, although based on an orienting response, also possesses a perspective-taking component. In particular, the observer may understand that when others look in a certain direction it is because they are seeing something interesting or unusual. Contrasting the orientation and the perspective-taking alternatives brings us face to face with the topic of this paper. Are animals like chimpanzees behavior-readers only or mind-readers too?
There are several studies to help us decide which one of these two alternatives is more accurate. First, chimpanzees follow the gaze direction of humans to a specific location even if they have to look past and ignore other novel objects along the way in order to fixate the target location. This would seem to indicate that they are not just turning in the same general direction as the looker and then searching randomly for something interesting; they are targeting the looker's perceptual activity (Tomasello, Hare, & Agnetta, 1999) . Second, if adult chimpanzees track the gaze of another individual to a location and find nothing interesting there, they quite often look back to the individual's face and track her gaze direction a second time . This "checking back" -which only adult chimpanzees do -is a key criterion used to assess human infants' understanding of the visual experience of others, since it would seem to indicate that the subject expects to find a target of the looker's perceptual orientation. Interestingly, if a looker looks repeatedly to a location with no salient target, adult (but again not juvenile) chimpanzees stop responding to that individual's looking behavior (Tomasello, Hare, & Fogleman, 2001 ), indicating acquired expectations about when it is likely that following the gaze direction of another is likely to lead to an interesting target.
But perhaps the most telling situation occurs when a human looks behind a barrier. Following a suggestive finding of Povinelli and Eddy (1996) , Tomasello et al. (1999) had a human experimenter look around various types of barriers (or look straight ahead in a control condition). In this case, a simple gaze following response (turning head to look in the direction the experimenter is looking) would not be enough -that would simply lead to the subject fixating the barrier itself. To track the experimenter's gaze to its target subjects needed to move a few meters so as to attain the appropriate viewing angle to permit them to look behind the barrier. And this is just what they did (much more often than in the control condition) for all four of the barrier types investigated.
In summary, chimpanzees follow the gaze of others in flexible ways inconsistent with an automatic orienting response. When there is a distracter they ignore it; when there is a barrier they move themselves in order to see what the other is seeing; when they do not see anything novel in the absence of a barrier they check back and eventually stop looking if they repeatedly find nothing there. Thus, these results suggest that apes follow the gaze direction of others because they want to see what the other is seeing. The alternative is that individuals do not engage in perspective taking and have learned to react appropriately to each of these situations independently from each other.
The actions of others
If joint attention is a skill that allowed infants and adults to begin to coordinate their perceptions of the external world, understanding intentional action is a skill that allows infants to parse the complex streams of behavior displayed by adults (Baldwin, Baird, Sayler & Clark, 2001) . By being attuned to the intentions and goals of others, infants can anticipate the behavior of others, can learn from others (even in the absence of the solution), and can explain the behavior of others more effectively. Given such a central role in the development of social cognition, it is not surprising that the study of intentional and goal directed action has received considerable attention in recent years. By 6 months of age, infants have expectations about human actions, but not about inanimate objects performing similar actions. Woodward (1999) interpreted these results as evidence that infants perceive actions as goal directed. By 9 months of age infants can distinguish the motives behind certain actions (Behne, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, in press) , understand the actions of entities as goal-directed, and expect the use of efficient actions to achieve those goals (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) . Starting at 14 months of age infants can distinguish accidental versus intentional actions , perceive that others chose plans of action that meet the requirements of the situation (Gergely et al., 2002) , and can use unfulfilled actions on objects to produce the intended goal of a demonstrator (Meltzoff, 1995) .
Although Premack and Woodruff 's (1978) study on chimpanzee intentions signaled the starting point to the now vast literature on children's theory of mind, comparatively little progress has been made with nonhuman animals since then. There are only a handful of studies devoted to the study of intentions -and those represent a patchy collection of positive, negative, and unclear results. Here, I will concentrate on those paradigms that have produced data both for children and apes.
First, there is the behavioral re-enactment procedure developed by Meltzoff (1995) to assess infants' understanding of unfulfilled actions. In this task, infants witnessed a human model repeatedly trying to produce a result on an object but failing to achieve her goal (unfulfilled condition). For instance, trying to pull apart a dumbbell or trying to hang a rubber band on a peg. After children observed this demonstration, they were handed the object and the experimenter scored whether the infant reproduced the intended outcome. This condition was compared to other conditions in which the human model produced the desired outcome (full demonstration condition) and another in which the model manipulated the object without trying to produce the effect (manipulation condition). Eighteen-month-old infants reproduced the target action in both the full demonstration and unfulfilled conditions equally often, and significantly more often than in the manipulation condition.
Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa (2000) adapted this procedure to test chimpanzees and also found no differences between full demonstration and unfulfilled conditions, but in this case the similarity was due to a very low successful performance in both conditions. Neither condition substantially improved the chimpanzees' performance. Similarly, Call, Carpenter and Tomasello (2005) also tested chimpanzees and found no significant differences between those conditions and the baseline condition in which subjects were given no information on how to manipulate the objects. Nevertheless, subjects in the unfulfilled condition seemed less likely to reproduce the result that the experimenter was trying. For instance, if the experimenter unsuccessfully tried to open a tube by breaking it in the center, subjects opened it by removing its bottom and top lids. Conversely if the human tried to remove the lids, subjects tended to break the tube in the center.
Second, we used another paradigm to test whether chimpanzees and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) understood the distinction between intentional and accidental actions. Although we could have adapted one of the paradigms based on imitation (e.g., , we disregarded this possibility given the little inclination of apes to reproduce actions (see Call & Carpenter, 2003) . Instead we opted for a paradigm in which a human offered cues to the ape about the location of hidden food. In particular, trained chimpanzees and orangutans to use a landmark placed on top of one of three opaque containers as an indicator of the location of hidden food. During training the apes never saw the human actually placing the marker on the container, but the marker was already on top of one of the containers when they were presented to the ape. On test trials a human experimenter then placed the marker on one of the containers intentionally, but either before or after this he let the marker fall accidentally onto one of the other containers. The marker was removed at the time of choice of the ape, so for test trials the ape was faced with a choice in which one bucket had been marked with the marker intentionally and the other accidentally. Apes as a group chose the container that was marked intentionally, although no individual except a language-trained orangutan was above chance on his own. The apes' performance was comparable to that of 2.5 year-old children presented with the same task and worse than that of 3-year-old children.
Third, we investigated whether chimpanzees can gauge the motives of a human experimenter; more specifically we tested whether in a food sharing situation they can distinguish between a human who is unwilling to give them food from one that is unable to do so. Thus, we presented chimpanzees with a situation in which a human gave them food through a hole in their cage. After the experimenter had passed a few grapes to the subject, he took another grape but did not pass it to the subject and we manipulated the reason for stopping the transfer. In some cases, he was unable because the hole was too small, it was occupied with other tasks, or did not see the food. In other cases, he was unwilling to give the food. In such trials he put the food close to the ape but would then pull it back, or left the food on the platform and stared at the ape for no apparent reason, or just ate the food. Overall, we presented three trios of unwilling and unable conditions. Each trio consisted of an unwilling condition paired with two unable conditions. Each trio shared some basic features such as the overall motions of the grape or the experimenter's gazing pattern.
The reason for having multiple conditions organized in trios was double. First, we wanted to get as many conditions as possible so that a potential difference could not be accounted for by a superficial difference between a single unwilling and a single unable condition. Second, organizing the conditions in trios allowed us to control to some extent the effect some variables had; such as the reward's motion patterns and the eye contact between the experimenter and the subject. For instance, if we had only had a single unwilling condition that involved eye contact between the experimenter and the subject and a single unable condition that did not, then one could argue that any differences between conditions are due to the presence of eye contact. Eye contact may have simply made subjects more nervous and that, not intention assessment, was the reason underlying the observed differences.
One important methodological consideration of this study is that we did not train subjects to respond in any way, they were not differentially reinforced for their responses, and we only administered two trials per condition. Instead we scored the natural reactions of the chimpanzees and assessed whether they behaved differentially across conditions. In particular we scored two variables: behaviors directed at the experimenter or the food (in most cases these were aimed at convincing the experimenter to transfer the food) and how long subjects remained at the testing station without receiving food. Chimpanzees reacted in different ways to unwilling and unable conditions. When the experimenter was unwilling, they gestured more and they left the testing station earlier than when the experimenter was unable to pass the food. This difference existed even though they were not differentially rewarded. One can postulate a different explanation for each difference across conditions or one can argue that the underlying principal is behind several of those conditions. Note that these findings were comparable to those found with 9-to 18-month-old infants (Behne et al., in press ).
In summary, chimpanzees distinguished between an experimenter that was unwilling and one who was unable to give them food. They also distinguished the intentional from the accidental actions of a human in a communicative situation. In contrast, there was little evidence that they benefited from witnessing unfulfilled actions in a social learning situation. Thus, these results suggest that apes go beyond the observable information and infer the goals of others. Again, the alternative, as was the case in the area of attention, is that individuals have learned to respond to each situation independently.
Parsimony and mental state attribution
In trying to make a case for the use of psychological states in apes, I chose to explore the most recent evidence on the understanding of perception and actions in others. Recent developments support earlier proposals regarding the mental attribution skills of the great apes (e.g., Whiten & Byrne, 1988) . Chimpanzees (and other apes) can follow the gaze of others around barriers, past distracters, check back when they do not detect anything remarkable, and stop looking if they find nothing in repeated occasions. In regard to actions, chimpanzees and orangutans distinguish intentional from accidental actions and they can gauge the motives of a human passing them food. Taken together, these results suggest that apes have some understanding of attention and intention. Recently, Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) reached a similar conclusion after reviewing the available literature.
Against this conclusion, one can argue that there is no need to postulate anything beyond perceiving and reacting to behavioral cues (e.g., Povinelli & Vonk, 2003) . Each particular condition within the various experiments can be explained as reacting to particular contingencies. Therefore, these results may tell us nothing about apes' ability to infer psychological states in others. After all, one could argue, individuals have to use observable behavior to react appropriately to their social partners in the first place, so there is no need to postulate anything else beyond analyzing behavior. Although it is clear that observable information has to be the basis for apes' reasoning about their social world, it does not necessarily have to remain at the behavioral level. In fact, there is ample evidence than many animals process information beyond perceptual inputs (e.g., Vauclair, 1996) . Moreover, the strength of the argument based on observable information exclusively is weakened when one has to postulate different explanations for each phenomenon within a given domain such as attention. Tomasello and Call (in press) argued that the alternative to postulating some understanding of what others can or cannot see is no less than 12 different behavioral explanations for each of the known phenomena in this domain. Finally, another set of post-hoc behavior-based explanations is needed to accommodate the findings of another domain such as intention.
The alternative to multiplying explanations for each particular observation is to postulate that individuals do indeed go beyond behavioral cues thus making some inferences about the psychological states of others. Whiten (1994) used the notion of an intervening variable to make a case for mindreading in primates so that disparate behavioral acts may be based on the same mental state. Thus, the observations regarding perception and actions may correspond to the psychological states of attention and intention, respectively. If we accept this possibility, it is critical that we specify the nature of this psychological level. Although we have argued that the data available are not easily explained by invoking a purely behavioral dimension based on detecting behavioral cues, it is also true that there is no solid evidence to suggest that the understanding of epistemic states plays a fundamental role in the social cognition of apes. Instead, we have argued that these data reflects the operation of psychological states of attention and intention.
To be more specific, understanding attention in others refers to the ability to appreciate what others can or cannot see or so-called level I perspective taking (Flavell, 1992) . Currently, it is unclear whether individuals also display level II perspective taking, that is, they appreciate how others will see certain events. This would involve imagining how a given object would look from a different angle, not just whether it would be visible or not. Likewise, Tomasello et al. (in press) have argued that intention of the kinds described for the apes and young infants may be based on perceiving goals, not necessarily imagining a plan for action. In other words, the available data can be explained by postulating that apes appreciate what others are trying to accomplish but there is no evidence suggesting that they can also imagine how a given individual is going to accomplish her goal. Note that this what-how distinction is common to attention and intention. Future research should help us specify the relation between what and how within and between domains such as attention and intention. More specifically, future research should move in at least two directions. First, investigate further those psychological states for which there is some evidence available, such as attention or intention, by trying to see if there is more than level I perspective taking (i.e., the what vs. how distinction). Second, explore whether other psychological constructs such as desires or even epistemic states such as knowledge and belief are part of the apes' suite of psychological states. Such a piecemeal approach reflects the need to treat the different psychological states separately because each informs about different aspects Whiten, 1994) . Although epistemic states such as knowledge or belief have attracted most research attention, and some authors argue that it is only with such states that children develop a coherent theory of mind (e.g., BaronCohen, 1995) , it is worth noting that psychological states such as attention or intention are very likely to be more basic than epistemic states both from an ontogenetic and a phylogenetic perspective.
The motivation to share: No magic bullet but a key ingredient
So far I have presented a case for narrowing the gap between apes and humans with the regard to the sensitivity to some psychological states. After highlighting the similarities, the reader may wonder about the differences, because even if we share some psychological states with apes, our minds are still quite different. The easy way out would be to say that it is the epistemic states that distinguish us from them. Even though epistemic states play a fundamental role in the way our social cognition works, the differences between humans and apes can be seen even before epistemic states take center stage in children at around four years of age. Recently, we have proposed that the intrinsic motivation to share experiences with others may be critical (Tomasello et al., in press ). This aspect combined with the ability to reason about psychological states is what may make human minds. But before I develop that idea further let me say a word about the social cognition of other animals.
Breaking the human 'monopoly' on psychological states to bring the apes into the 'inner circle' , may give the impression that only apes and humans make inferences about the psychological states of others. However, it is conceivable that other animals, even those that are distantly related to us, may also have some ability to appreciate the psychological states of others. Recent studies are beginning to show that various mammals and birds have sophisticated social cognitive skills (see papers in Rogers & Kaplan, 2004) . For instance, dogs can follow gaze to locations behind themselves Miklósi et al., 1998) , will not take forbidden food when humans are looking at them (Call, Bräuer, Kaminski & Tomasello, 2003) , and can take the perspective of humans even when they cannot directly see them (Bräuer, Call & Tomasello, 2004) . These results suggest that dogs have perspective-taking abilities comparable to those of chimpanzees. It would not be surprising to find comparable skills in other species as well once research is conducted.
Returning to the issue of human minds, Tomasello et al. (in press ) argued that human cognition is grounded on two converging developments: the ability to infer psychological states and the motivation to share emotions and experiences. We have already indicated that humans and apes can infer some psychological states such as attention and intention. We have also indicated that there is no evidence that apes understand epistemic states or even certain levels of attention (e.g., level II perspective taking). These may be important differences between humans and apes but they only become evident after human infants' second or third birthdays. Tomasello et al. (in press) argued that another important difference appears much earlier in time and from a different direction. Human infants, unlike apes, are intrinsically motivated to share emotions and experiences. Although apes can be said to engage in joint attention defined as looking at the same object and at the social partner, they do not direct the attention of others to interesting sights of their environment just to share that experience. It is true that they vocalize when they sight food or predators but in those situations the main target of interest is the sighted object, not the social partner. In contrast, human infants direct attention to outside entities just to share attention with their partners; the so-called declarative gestures. It is the social interaction that is critical, not the object per se. Interestingly, even though apes often use imperative gestures in various contexts such as play, sex, or feeding, unlike children, they very rarely engage in declarative gestures. It is hypothesized that this motivation to share experiences with others, has important repercussions on the development of social cognition in humans. In fact, one of the early indicators of developmental deficits in children with autism is the lack of declarative gestures ( Baron-Cohen, 1995) . Note that children with autism are also delayed in their ability to solve tasks of false belief attribution. This is not to say that the motivation to share is the key ingredient for developing human social cognition. It is better characterized as a key ingredient that together with the ability to infer psychological states may make the social minds displayed by typicallydeveloping humans.
